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Idealism and Christian Theology is a collection of papers aimed at showing theconsistency of idealism and Christian theology. The book is centered around twoproponents of idealism: George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards. Idealism, at aminimum, is the claim that there are only minds and ideas. Matter, understood as anextended substance, cannot exist.1 For example, on Berkeley’s idealism a thing existsif and only if that thing is either perceived or is a thing that perceives. The main thesisof the book is that idealism is compatible with Christian theology, and in some areas,it might be superior to metaphysical views that postulate matter.2The book deals with many theological topics such as: idealism and biblicalconsistency, the problem of evil, the Imago Dei, the corruption of the body, theresurrection, the Incarnation, the Eucharist, and much more. I will only directlydiscuss a few of these topics because of the word limitation: the consistency ofidealism and Scripture, the problem of evil, and the Incarnation. The main reason Ichose these topics is because I think they are crucial in establishing the main thesis ofthe book, and I personally found them exceptionally interesting. This doesn’t meanthat the other topics are not interesting or worth thinking about. They definitely are.Unfortunately, given the word limitation, I have to pick and choose.In James S. Spiegel’s paper, “The Theological Orthodoxy of Berkeley’sImmaterialism,” he argues for two claims, which he calls the consistency thesis andthe endorsement thesis. The former is the thesis that there is nothing in Scripture thatcontradicts Berkeley’s idealism. The latter is the thesis that there are some things inScripture that count in favor of Berkeley’s idealism. Consider the consistency thesis.Are the claims in Scripture consistent with the view that there are only minds andideas? For example, Scripture seems to recognize the existence of things like boats,fish, and other sensory objects. Are these scriptural claims inconsistent withidealism? According to idealism, these sensory objects do exist, but they are notmaterial objects. Rather, they are ideas that are communicated to finite mindsthrough the divine mind. Spiegel’s strategy in defending the consistency thesis is to
1 Given the types of arguments that Berkeley and Edwards use against the existence of matter, it seemsclear that they held to the stronger position: that the existence of extended matter is impossible.2 The papers in the book take it for granted that matter is an extended thing. Unfortunately, they donot consider other views of matter (e.g. matter as pure potentiality).
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argue, along with Berkeley, that the burden of proof is on the one who claims thatidealism is inconsistent with Scripture. Spiegel then attempts to show that argumentsfor the inconsistency of idealism and Scripture fail.It is not always clear who has the burden of proof in most situations, but let ussuppose that the burden of proof is on the one who claims that idealism isinconsistent with Scripture. Moreover, let us suppose that it hasn’t yet beendemonstrated that idealism is inconsistent with Scripture. How does it follow fromthis that the consistency thesis is true? It doesn’t. One can simply be agnostic aboutwhether Scripture is consistent with idealism. More has to be done by Spiegel to showthat the consistency thesis is true than simply to rebut arguments against itsinconsistency. Here is another way to see the issue. Suppose God wrote a commentaryon the entirety of Scripture. Suppose that this is an exhaustive commentary that tellsyou the meaning of everything about Scripture, including every single word. Suppose,finally, that I argue that the other side hasn’t shown that this divine commentarywould be incompatible with idealism. Does it follow from this that idealism iscompatible with this divine commentary? I think not.Metaphysically speaking there are two options: either idealism is compatiblewith Scripture or it is not. However, epistemically speaking there are more than twooptions. A third option, beyond assenting to the consistency or inconsistency of thequestion at issue, is to be agnostic about whether idealism is consistent withScripture. Thus, there are two types of consistency, epistemic and metaphysicalconsistency. Perhaps Spiegel has shown epistemic consistency. That is, for all weknow, idealism is consistent with Scripture. This type of consistency capitalizes onthe fact that Scripture doesn’t go beyond talking about ordinary objects. In otherwords, Scripture doesn’t, in itself, provide us with an explicit metaphysical story forunderstanding ordinary objects, and the idealist capitalizes on that fact. But this typeof consistency is very cheap. A full materialist in the Hobbesian sense can have thistype of consistency. This type of materialist holds that everything, including God, ismade out of matter. However, God is made out of very fine matter, whereas angelsand souls are made out of less fine matter, and bodies even less fine. When Scripturesays that “God is spirit,” it is a way of saying that God is made of the finest type ofmatter. It’s easy to get epistemic consistency because Scripture is not aimed atexplicitly dislodging metaphysical views like idealism or Hobbesian materialism.Metaphysical consistency, on the other hand, is more difficult to achieve. Providingevidence for metaphysical consistency would amount to providing evidence thatone’s view is consistent with the divine commentary that I spoke of earlier. Merelypointing to the fact that the other side hasn’t shown idealism’s inconsistency isn’tsufficient to establish the consistency thesis, understood in this latter way.We can even go a step further and argue against the consistency thesis. Givenwhat we know about the cultural milieu of the first century and the beliefs of thewriters of the New Testament (and the Old Testament), it is likely that they didn’tbelieve in idealism. When this fact is coupled with the fact that the intentions of theauthors matter in how one interprets Scripture, we have some evidence that idealism
Review of Idealism and Christian Theology Omar Fakhri
718
isn’t consistent with Scripture.3 Of course, it doesn’t follow from this that theexistence of extended matter is consistent with Scripture. Perhaps matter should beunderstood as something else, like pure potentiality. It is likely that the writers ofScripture believed that matter existed, however one might understand that, andhence when they wrote about boats and fish, they didn’t think these should beunderstood as ideas in one’s mind. Thus, the writers of Scripture likely didn’tunderstand the ordinary notions in Scripture in the way idealists understand them.How did they understand those ordinary notions then? That’s a question for biblicalscholars to settle. We don’t need to establish what the writers of Scripture thoughtthese ordinary objects are in order to have a good idea that they probably didn’t thinkof them as mere collections of ideas in a mind. In other words, we don’t need to knowwhat the writers of Scripture actually thought in order to know that they likely didn’tthink of ordinary objects as mere collections of ideas. Here is a thought experiment insupport of the point. Suppose you are in a conversation with the Apostle Matthew.You ask him: by “fish” did you just mean an idea in our mind? I suspect a first-centuryJew would think it absurd that this is how you’d interpret his words.What about the endorsement thesis? One key passage cited by Spiegel insupport of the endorsement thesis is Acts 17:28, where Paul says that in God “we liveand move and have our being.” On idealism, in order for anything to exist, includingfinite minds, God must perceive it. God is the only mind who perceives himself, andhence exists necessarily. Our existence is dependent on God’s mind. Thus, idealismcan make good sense of the Acts passage. I agree; I do think idealism can make goodsense of the Acts passage. However, in order for this passage to be an endorsement ofidealism, the passage needs to show either that only idealism can make sense of thispassage or that idealism is the most likely or plausible option for understanding thepassage. I for one, don’t think St. Paul had idealism in mind. And I also think that adualist—someone who thinks matter and minds exist—can make equally good senseof the passage. Instead of talking about the perceiving relation, one can simply talkabout the sustaining relation. God has causal powers, and He uses these powers tosustain the world. As Thomas Aquinas puts it: if God were to step back from sustainingthe world for one second, the entire cosmos would cease to exist. At any rate, moreneeds to be done to show that the Acts passage endorses idealism. Idealism can
account for the passage, but so can other non-idealist views.Perhaps the worry is that the sustaining relation is more difficult to decipherthan the perceiving relation. Why might this be the case? For one, I’m personallyacquainted with the perceiving relation because I often perceive things. However, thetype of perceiving in question is different than the perceiving I am acquainted with.On Berkeley’s view, for example, ordinary objects continue to exist even when I, orany other finite being, don’t perceive them. One way to understand this is that if Iwere to be in the right place at the right time, then I would perceive said object. Thiscounterfactual is made true by God’s power. What is this power? I’m surely notacquainted with that type of power. Hence, acquaintance is not going to help very
3 To show the inconsistency between idealism and Scripture, one might also need to adopt the doctrinethat every word in Scripture is divinely inspired and has a particular meaning and purpose. Thus,ordinary notions like fish and boats are not without their metaphysical baggage.
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much here. It’s not clear that this power is better understood than the sustainingrelation.4In Jordan Wessling’s intriguing paper, “Idealistic Panentheism: Reflections onJonathan Edwards’s Account of the God-World Relation,” he defends Edwards’idealistic panentheism against the problem of evil. According to Edwards’panentheism, the world is a collection of ideas in the divine mind. If so, then evil is inthe divine mind. Does this make God evil in anyway? According to Wessling, what istrue of the part is not necessarily true of the whole. Although there is evil in the divinemind, it may be that God as a whole is not evil because the divine mind, or the divineideas contained within that mind, is but one part of God.It’s tempting to have the following image of panentheism: God’s mind is a circleand creation is “inside” of this circle. This picture suggests that God’s mind, the circle,can be safe from the evils in the circle. I think a better depiction of panentheism isthat we are modes of God’s mind. Think about a carpet with a wrinkle. The wrinkle isa mode of the carpet. It is nothing over-and-above the carpet. This mode is notcontained in the carpet nor does it “sit” on top of the carpet. Rather, it is a way thecarpet is presented. Assuming the carpet depiction of panentheism is accurate, itshows that Wessling’s part-whole response does not alleviate the entire problem. Forjust like how we can say that part of the carpet is wrinkled, we can likewise say thatpart of God is evil. Evil here is understood in a metaphysical way. Perhaps God is notmorally culpable for this evil, but nonetheless, God is in part evil. As some of theEastern Fathers held, evil is a type of sickness that can be located in different parts ofthe soul, such as in the nous or the passions. It’s true that when it comes to culpabilitythe entire person is what’s culpable, but this is compatible with particular evils beinglocated in particular parts of the soul. Similarly, God might not be culpable for theevils that inhabit His mind, but He still has evil parts. If I can’t be perfect while havingevil in some parts of my soul, then it’s not clear how God can be perfect while havingevil in some parts of Him. This seems to be an unwelcome consequence.Here is a second worry. According to a long standing Christian tradition, Godis pure actuality, and some evil is a type of privation and hence a potentiality.5 Thosetwo things are incompatible.6 If God is pure actuality, and some evils are a type ofpotentiality, then God can’t be pure actuality. Perhaps the idealistic panentheist isready to give up one of those claims. I don’t think that’s a good option, and it is not
4 Things might even look worse for the Berkeleyan idealism because according to Berkeley, God doesn’thave sensory ideas. Consider what William J. Wainwright says: “Another possibility is that even thoughno finite minds perceive the desk, God does, and so the desk continues to exist when no finite mindsperceive it. The problem with this suggestion is, first, that Berkeley does not think that God has sensoryideas” (38).5 Wessling addresses the view that evil is a privation. He argues that “it is not obvious that each andevery bad state of affairs is simply a privation” (63). Putting aside whether Wessling’s objectionsucceeds, for our purposes, we just need one bad state of affairs to be a privation, not every bad stateof affairs to be a privation. Thus, if his objection is successful, it would only follow that not every badstate of affairs is a privation. But that is compatible with at least one evil being a privation.6 It’s worth mentioning that this argument can get going merely from the fact that there is potentialityin the world. It doesn’t need to refer to evil specifically.
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clear that Edwards would have given up that God is pure actuality.7 At any rate, it isimportant to see some of the costs or implications of this view.8Oliver D. Crisp’s paper, “Jonathan Edwards, Idealism, and Christology,” arguesthat Edwards’ metaphysical commitments are compatible with orthodox Christology,with one exception. The one exception is what Crisp calls the problem of the necessityof the Incarnation. Edwards’ metaphysical commitments seem to imply that theIncarnation is metaphysically necessary—morally necessary, to use Crisp’sterminology. Here I agree with Crisp that this is a problem, so I will put it aside.According to Crisp, Edwards is committed to the following metaphysicalviews: immaterialism, metaphysical antirealism, occasionalism, and pure actpanentheism. Immaterialism is synonymous with idealism. It’s the view that there areonly minds and ideas. However, on Edwards’ immaterialism, finite objects do notpersist through time. This is an example of the difference between Edwards’ idealismand Berkeley’s idealism. Thus, Edwards’ immaterialism implies the doctrine ofcontinual creation. God creates the world anew every instance. Metaphysicalantirealism is the view that finite things are radically dependent on God for theirexistence. Occasionalism is the view that God is the only real causal agent. Pure actpanentheism is the view that God is a simple pure act and that all finite things are inGod. Crisp considers a few potential problems that arise from Edwards’commitments. I will only look at one: Docetism. Does Edwards’ immaterialismcommit him to Docetism, the view that Christ’s body only appeared to be material? Inresponse, Crisp says, “There does not seem to be any obvious theological reason torefrain from adopting immaterialism that depends upon matters Christological. Foran immaterialist such as Edwards can affirm all the catholic creedal statementspertaining to Christ” (p. 158). Crisp proceeds by quoting the Chalcedonian definitionas something that Edwards can fully assent to. According to Crisp, Edwards’s view iscompatible with the creedal statements because he doesn’t think Christ has a bodythat is different from other human bodies. The creedal statements do not condemnthe claim that Christ didn’t have a material body. Rather, they merely condemn theclaim that Christ’s body is different from other human bodies.This is what I find odd about Crisp’s position. The creeds and definitions of theChurch should not be stripped of their metaphysical background. Consider thefollowing example to see what I mean. Traditionally, modalism—the view that God isone hypostasis that appears in three ways—was condemned by the Councils.However, consider a new brand of modalism that agrees with the traditionalTrinitarian formulation that God is three hypostases in one ousia. We can imagine thisnew modalist saying the following:
7 Consider what Oliver D. Crisp says here: “…Edwards is also a pure act panentheist. This is a neologism,a compound of the idea that God is a simple pure act, and panentheism” (156, emphasis mine.)8 Wessling notes costs like this one. In response, Wessling suggests that an idealistic panentheist mighthold that divine simplicity is a contingent feature of God. With creation, God is no longer simple. Oneproblem with this is that contingency in the divine nature, i.e. internal contingency, is a potentiality,and hence implies that God is not pure act, which implies that God is not simple. Thus, it is impossiblefor God to be contingently simple. On this version of idealistic panentheism, one doesn’t have theoption of adopting contingent simplicity. Rather, one must reject simplicity wholesale.
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I can fully accept the traditional understanding of the Trinity. My onlydisagreement is with how the Church understood hypostasis.According to my view, a hypostasis is just a mode of presentation. Thus,I can affirm that there are three hypostases in the Trinity. I just don’tadopt their metaphysical views of how they understood hypostasis.I fear that there is something similar going on with Crisp’s suggestion. We have decentevidence that the writers of the Chalcedonian definition don’t understand the words“perfect in humanity” (among others) the same way that Edwards understands them.Here is the upshot: if we strip the traditional teachings of their metaphysicalbackground, then they become metaphysically empty. It is no surprise then that wecan easily argue that they are compatible with some metaphysical view. However,stripping traditional teachings from their metaphysical background seemsproblematic and leads to unwelcome consequences.
Idealism and Christian Theology explores a host of interesting topics that Ihaven’t looked at in this review. In fact, the three papers I’ve discussed also explore ahost of interesting topics that I haven’t looked at in this review. These topics fallsquarely in the intersection of theology and analytic philosophy. One main virtue ofthe book is that it builds a bridge between the theologian and the analyticphilosopher. If you’re the former and you’re interested in analytic philosophy oryou’re the latter and interested in theology, then this book is a good place to start.
